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Abstract: Central to market fundamentals are three ideas: (1) Nominal money (2)
Dividend (3) Existing stock. In connection with the cumulative dividend stream
criterion of fundamental and noise movement, the conception of sequentially
stable Markov process is grounded on the theory of bubbles. This paper firstly
embodies the origin of speculative bubble burst with overconfidence. Then,
unique equilibrium with inertia is re-illuminated by the overconfidence.
Keywords: externalities, speculative bubbles, heterogeneous beliefs,
overconfidence, speculative bubble burst, equilibrium with inertia.
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1. Introduction
By applying the equilibrium-conceptual approach to stability of markets, eco-
nomic and financial crisis from 2008 illuminates familiar problems from a new an-
gle, to pose provocative questions that the price level changes rapidly even though
economic fundamentals are seemed to have no problem. Neoclassicals, main-
stream scholars in the Microeconomic foundation, ferrot out this key problem by
the axiomatic approach. In Microeconomics, classically, economic equilibrium is
a state where economic forces such as supply and demand are balanced without
externalities and equilibrium values of variables are stabilized. In what follows,
we explore the case with externalities with (1) shocks (2) speculative bubbles and
(3) an inertia mechanism.
1This work was achieved through the Laboratory of Excellence on Financial Regulation (Labex
ReFi) supported by PRES heSam under the reference ANR-10-LABX-0095. It benefitted from a
French government support managed by the National Research Agency (ANR) within the project
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under the reference ANR-11-IDEX-0006-02.
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We offer a new interpretation of overconfidence as motivation not to participate in
economic activities immediately. Risk-averse agents provide a much more ratio-
nal way to solve the puzzle of externalities. If beliefs of traders are concordant
(Milgrom and Stokey, 1982): traders agree about how information should be inter-
preted, Concordant beliefs arise naturally in statistical problems where there is an
unknown parameter about which traders may hold different views.
In connection with this belief, the basic framework of trading can take the financing
source as a focal point:
(1) Fiat money (Santos and Woodford, 1997).
(2) Self-enforcing debt (Hellwig and Lorenzoni, 2009).
Let us initiate a discussion of the separation between asset pricing bubbles and
speculative bubbles. For example, during the German hyperinflation, Flood and
Garber (1980) had immense appeal for hypothesis of no speculative bubbles. How-
ever, theoretically, financial market setting emphasizes on finite wealth, the finite
horizon and short-selling behavior of risk-averse finitely lived agents. Hence, the
bubble condition cannot be paralleled with transversality or boundary conditions.
The methodological part of speculative bubble has come to debate on a Markov
process and an equilibrium. The article “Sunspots and Cycles” (Azariadis and
Guesnerie, 1986) is devoted to the detailed technique with sequentially stable Markov
process in accordance with perfect foresight. Unstable beliefs in the form of the
transition probability matrix are intended to yield a regular stationary sunspot equi-
librium (SSE).
In this article, market fundamentals becomes apparent with three concepts of O.Blanchard
(1979) in the section 2. The section 3 introduces the infinitesimal generator to cu-
mulative dividend process. In the section 4, psychological factors of agents like ag-
gregated beliefs, overconfidence carry implications for a speculative bubble crush
with an infinitesimal generator. In the section 5, origin of speculative bubble burst
and unique trading point are addressed. In the section 6, existence of unique equi-
librium allocation with inertia at the speculative bubble crush is described. I shall
proceed in the following with regard to the literature.
2. Axiomatic Foundations of Speculative Bubbles
Market fundamentals rank the price level xt in a discrete-time framework ac-
cording to
xt = ft + aE(xt+1 | Ωt), a ∈ (0, 1), t ∈ N
where xt is the price level, ft is fundamentals and Ωt is the information set.
It becomes apparent with three examples suggested by O. Blanchard (1979):
2
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1. Reduced form of a money market equilibrium: xt is price level and ft is nom-
inal money (Flood and Garber, 1980)
2. Arbitrage equation: xt is price of share and ft is dividend (Scheinkman and
Xiong, 2003)
3. Equilibrium of a material market (for example the gold market): xt is price
and ft is existing stock (Harrison and Kreps, 1978)
No single answer about the definition of bubbles will suffice but it is highly
probable that bubbles are price deviations from their fundamentals similar to Allen
and Gorton (1993). Still, it bristles with ambiguity how price simply goes down
when bubble bursts even though bubble is itself a rich assembly of determinants.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) formulated a criterion linked to the continuous-
time cumulative dividend stream. The buyer’s willingness to pay is a function of
the value of the option that he acquires, the payoff from stopping is (Stokey, Lucas
and Prescott, 1989), in turn, related to the value of option like American options
with no maturity. The continuous-time cumulative dividend process Dt is given by
dDt = ftdt + σDdZDt , (1)
where f is the fundamental random variable, σD is a constant volatility parameter
and ZDt denotes the standard Brownian motion of the process Dt. The value of
process ft is defined by
d ft = −λ( ft − f )dt + σ f dZ ft , (2)
where mean reversion is non negative such that λ ≥ 0, and f denotes long-run
mean of f .
The idea centered on the speculative behavior if the right to resell stock makes
them willing to pay more. Relevant to “churn bubbles" of Allen and Gorton (1993),
fund managers are ready to negotiate trading above their fundamental even though
bubble can crash by a bad luck.
3. Dividend Process and the Infinitesimal Generator “A" of the parameter Tt
Let us induce the fundamental and noise movement from the dividend stream
in equation (3) with an infinitesimal generator “A" defined by
A f = lim
t→0
(Tt f − f )
t
,
3
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where Tt satisfies the property of a feller semigroup. Thus, I define the cumulative
dividend process by
dDt = A ftdt + σDdZDt , (3)
where the value of f is given in equation (2).
It is worth noting that the collection of parameters denoted by {Tt}t≥0 is a feller
semigroup (≡ Tt+s = Tt ◦ Ts). It is positive linear and contracting mapping from
the space of all real-valued continuous functions on a locally compact topological
space (bounded borel function, Revuz and Yor, 1991) with a countable base that
vanish at infinity. The contraction mapping is equipped with the sup-norm ‖ · ‖ for
all t ≥ 0 such that
‖Tt f ‖ ≤ ‖ f ‖,
and satisfies properties like resolvent and spectrum (Revuz and Yor, 1991).
The resolvent of a feller process (or semigroup) is a collection of maps (Aλ)λ>0
for any λ ∈ R+ defined by
Aλ f =
∫ ∞
0
e−λtTt f dt
It can be shown that it satisfies the identity.
AλAµ = AµAλ = (Aµ − Aλ)/(λ − µ).
The spectrum is the complement of the resolvent set: σ(A) = R − Aλ.
If an infinitesimal generator A fails to maintain the uniform limit of fundamental
random variable A ftdt, it means that A is not resolvent and no spectrum of A existed
in
A f = lim
t→0
(Tt f − f )
t
.
Fleshing out the infinitesimal generator takes a highly microscopic approach to the
question of bubble phenomenon that fundamentals have the tendency to become
noise factors during crisis. In examining the speculative bubble crush, I take up
memory-less property of Brownian motion.
• A Brownian motion is an example of feller processes.
• Every feller process satisfies the strong Markov property (memory-less).
• A stochastic process has the Markov property if the conditional probability
distribution of future state of the process depends only upon the present states
defined in terms of a random variable known as a stopping time.
4
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4. Aggregation of Beliefs
Consider two groups of agents A and B who observes a vector of their own
signals sA and sB. Assume that heterogeneous beliefs increased by overconfidence
offer joint dynamics of the D, f , sA, sB. All agents observe a vector of each signal
sA and sB that satisfy:
dsAt = AA ftdt + σsdZAt ,
similarly for dsBt . Here, agents of groupA(B) believe that innovations dZA (dZB)
in the signal sA(sB) are correlated with the common volatility of signals σs and the
innovation dZ f in the fundamental process. This process is by Bayesian analysis
of the normal distribution.
a(dDt−dsAt )2+b(dDt−dsBt )2 ≈ (a+b)
x − (adsAt + bdsBt )(a + b)
2+ ab
(a + b)(dsAt − dsBt )2
The factor
(adsAt + bdsBt )
(a + b)
has the form of a weighted average of dsAt and dsBt .
ab
(a + b)
= (a−1 + b−1)−1.
Remark 4.1. The factor (adsAt + bdsBt )/(a + b) has the form of a weighted average
of dsAt and dsBt along ab/(a + b) = (a−1 + b−1)−1. For combination of a and b, it’s
necessary to reciprocate, add, and reciprocate the result again to get back into the
origin units. ab/(a + b) is one-half of the harmonic mean of a and b.
If agents in group A trust more their own signal sA than the true information,
agents are highly confident to undertake some speculative action. Intentionally, the
overconfidence about fundamentals is divided into the part of fundamentals, signal
σs valued partial fundamentals dZ
f
t correlated with overconfidence φ (0 < φ < 1)
and signal σs valued noises dZAt which is fluctuated by the residual oscillation of
determined correlation with overconfidence. Hence,
dsAt = AA ftdt + σsφdZ
f
t + σs
√
1 − φ2dZAt .
and
dsBt = AB ftdt + σsφdZ
f
t + σs
√
1 − φ2dZBt .
Regardless of overconfidence = 0, differences of beliefs are according to:
gA = AB fˆB − AA fˆA,
gB = AA fˆA − AB fˆB = −gA.
5
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Whence:
dgA = AAd fˆB − ABd fˆA
= −ρgAdt + σgdWAg .
Overconfidence is newly coming up after heterogeneous beliefs’ movement when it
comes to need to distinguish fundamentals and noises depending to ρ andσ f . Coef-
ficients of Sheinkman and Xiong depend upon parameters of the model (λ, σD, σ f , σs, φ)
with an infinitesimal generator A according to:
ρ =
√
A(λ + φ
σ f
σs
)2
+ (1 − φ2)σ2f
( 2
σ2s
+
1
σ2D
)
,
σg =
√
2φσ f
The expressions for the second agent are analogously derived as:
dgB = dAA fˆA − dAB fˆB
= −ρgBdt + σgdWBg .
Without overconfidence, noises of heterogeneous beliefs can degenerate to 0. Then,
differences of groups concerning the volatility σ f , σs, σD and the combination of
an infinitesimal generator A and mean reversion λ are still considered. However,
with φσ f overconfidence on fundamental volatility, we can find the fluctuation
point of φσ f from ρ to σg.
Differences in beliefs across agents that will lead to trading. Let us suppose that the
optimistic investors A want to bid up prices and happen to hold the whole supply
of A and B, for:
pAt = sup
τ≥0
EAt
[∫ t+τ
t
exp[−r(s−t)]
[
f¯ + exp[−r(s − t)]( fˆAt − f¯ )
]
dDs+exp(−rτ)(pBt+τ−c)],
for the trading cost c : a seller B pays c ≥ 0 per unit of the asset sold. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) assumes the following form for the equilibrium price function of
group A :
pAt = pA
(
AA fˆAt , gAt
)
=
f¯
f
+
AA fˆA − f¯
r + λ
+ q(gAt ),
q(gAt ) = sup
τ≥0
EAt
[( gAt+τ
r + λ
)
+ q(gBt ) − c
)
exp(−rτ)
]
.
6
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In that, the bubble concept relates to the difference between the demand price of
the current owner (group A), i.e., group B in their exposition, and his fundamental
valuation along
b = q(−k∗)
= q(gA),
where k∗ denotes the minimum difference in opinion—between groupA and group
B—that generates a trade.
4.1. Can it be the Speculative Bubble or Overreaction to Surprises
Definition 4.2. Overconfidence parameter φ increases as a larger φ increases,
agents attribute to their own forecast of the current level of fundamentals where
0 < φ < 1.
It is important to note that dDt ≈ dsAt ≈ dsBt ≈ A f̂Adt where dDt denotes the
cumulative dividend process , dsAt is inferred value with signals of group A and
A f̂Adt is mean reverted fundamentals with mean reverted conditional belief and
an infinitesimal generator A. Then, conditional mean of beliefs of agents in group
A satisfies
dA f̂A = −λA( f̂A − f )dt + φσsσA f + γ
σ2s
(dsA − A f̂Adt)
+
γ
σ2s
(dsB − A f̂Adt) + γ
σ2D
(dD − A f̂Adt)
where agents in groupA overreact to surprises in sA because of overconfidence
(φ > 0) related to “surprises" with the common volatility of signals σs and related
Wiener processes are denoted as
dWAA =
1
σs
(dsA − A f̂Adt) (4)
dWAB =
1
σs
(dsB − A f̂Adt) (5)
and
dWAD =
1
σD
(dD − A f̂Adt). (6)
Similar representation of equations (4), (5), (6) can be obtained for group B by
simply replacing A f̂A by A f̂B.
7
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4.2. Overconfidence φ and an infinitesimal generator A as a speculative bubble
crush index
Definition 4.3. Speculative Bubble Crush Index A : The infinitesimal genera-
tor A as the Speculative Bubble Crush Index parameter is newly modeled from
(Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Regardless of A, agents attribute to their own
forecast of the current level of fundamentals as a larger overconfidence φ increases
(stationary solution agreed by Rogers and Williams 1987; sec. 6.9, Lipster and
Shiryaev 1977; theorem 12.7).
γ ≡
√
(Aλ + φ
σ f
σs
)2 + (1 − φ2)(2
σ2f
σ2s
+
σ2f
σ2D
) − (Aλ + φσ f
σs
)
1
σ2D
+
2
σ2s
Lemma 4.4. Stationary variance γ decreases with φ.
Proof. Letting
θ(φ) = (Aλ + φσ f /σs),
Ψ(φ) = (1 − φ2)[(2σ2f /σ2s) + σ2f /σ2D],
one derives:
dγ
dφ
=
[(2θ(φ)θ′(φ) + θ′(φ)]/[2
√
θ(φ)2 + Ψ(φ)] − θ(φ)
1/σ2D + 2/σ
2
s
=
[θ(φ)/
√
θ(φ)2 + Ψ(φ) − 1]θ′(φ) + Ψ′(φ)/2 √θ(φ)2
1/σ2D + 2/σ
2
s
≤ 0.
This is the same result as Lemma 1 in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Further,
we can extend to the origin of speculative bubble crush.
5. Origin of Speculative Bubble Burst and Unique Trading Point
5.1. Upper Boundary of Speculative Bubble Burst with Overconfidence
Lemma 5.1. If A (= θ′(λ)) is infinitesimal and B (= φσ f /σs) is significantly larger
than A, the stability Variance γ does not increase as mean reversion λ increases
and:
dγ
dλ
=
A
(Aλ + B)
− A < 0.
8
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Hence, B (= φσ f /σs) > Aλ.
Proof. Letting
θ(λ) = Aλ + φσ f /σs,
γ ≡
√
θ(λ)2+ ∼ − θ(λ)/( 1
σ2D
+
2
σ2s
),
it is derived that:
dγ
dλ
=
[ 1/2√
[θ(λ)2]
2θ′(λ) − θ′(λ)
] / ( 1
σ2D
+
2
σ2s
)
=
[
θ′(λ)√
θ(λ)2
− θ′(λ)
] / ( 1
σ2D
+
2
σ2s
)
= θ′(λ)
( 1
θ(λ)
− 1
) / ( 1
σ2D
+
2
σ2s
)
Omitting the constant terms 1/σ2D + 2/σ
2
s , the sign of dγ/dλ is the one of
A
( 1
θ(λ)
− 1
)
.
Remark that
θ′(λ) = A
= A
( 1[
Aλ + (φσ f /σs)
]
]
− 1
)
.
If A is a nonnegative real number, then
A
Aλ + B
− A < 0.
If A is infinitesimal, after the mean reversion,
Aλ > A.
If B > Aλ, then
A
2Aλ
− A < 0,
hence 1/Aλ < 2 and
A/(Aλ + B) − A < 0.
Even though the overconfidence parameter φ makes constant volatility of fun-
damentals allocated to the signal of each agent σ f smaller by σ f /σs, if φσ f /σs is
bigger than the mean reverted infinitesimal generator Aλ, stability is not kept by
mean reversion process.
9
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5.2. Origin of Speculative Bubble Burst
Theorem 5.2. (Origin of Speculative Bubble Crush)
Mean reversion λ doesn’t work to maintain the stability variance γ of random pro-
cess, the infinitesimal generator A is positive oscillation of fundamental value A
to maintain the Brownian motion affects mean reversion λ, then threshold of fun-
damental oscillation Aλ is captured by the noise movement between B(= φσ f /σs)
and −(σ f /σs), hence
−σ f /σs < Aλ < B(= φσ f /σs). (7)
Proof.
If A is nonnegative and less than 1, then
dγ
dλ
=
A
(Aλ + B)
− A < 0
It’s same with 1 < Aλ + B and 1 − φσ f /σs < Aλ
Forσ f > 0, σs > 0, 0 < (1 − φ)σ f + σs,
0 < σ f − φσ f + σs,−σ f < σs − φσ f ,−σ f
σs
<
σs
σs
− φσ f
σs
− σ f /σs < 1 − φσ f /σs < Aλ
The Breaking point of the forward process can be defined when the specula-
tive bubble crushes , the forward process cannot be completed and the backward
induction process is required. If the infinitesimal generator “A” is operated with
mean reversion λ, forward process perturbing from the final position which has
“bubbles" cannot be processed within the threshold −σ f /σs < Aλ < B(= φσ f /σs)
in A f = limt↓0(1/t)(Pt f − f ) where Pt is semi-group. Forward process can be
obtained by perturbing the final position, PtA f is the limit of
Pt(1/ε)(Pε f − f )) as ε→ 0.
Otherwise, backward induction procedure can be obtained by perturbing the initial
position:
∂Pt f = APt f = limε→0(1/ε)(Pε − I)Pt f .
Origin of Speculative Bubble Crush is spotted when dividend noise σDdZDt is
affected by the decrease of A ftdt in the equation (3).
10
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5.3. Individual Trade using properties of American Option, Smooth Pasting con-
dition. Unique “Trading Point" k∗
Existence For each trading cost c ≥ 0, there exists a unique trading point k∗ where
c(r + λ) is the expected present value of cost and h(·) is the solution of Ito’s
lemma condition that solves[
k∗ − c(r + λ)] [h′(k∗) + h′(−k∗)] − h(k∗) + h(−k∗) = 0.
Continuity of h’ If c = 0, then k∗ = 0.
Optimal Exercise Point If c > 0, k∗ > c(r + λ). (Wilmott, 2006)
Depending upon above properties of American option, optimal stopping should be
an equilibrium of optimal value function q executed if g0 > k∗, wait for the first if
the resale option g0 is bigger than the trading point k∗. Before pursuing the
equilibrium setting, by symmetry of heterogeneous beliefs, it’s clear to look the
(Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) as followings.
[Bubbles] (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
q(−k∗) = h(−k∗)/(r + λ) [h′(k∗) + h′(−k∗)]
[Resale option] (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) for x < k∗
q(x) = (q(−k∗)/h(−k∗)) × h(x)
for x ≥ k∗ as below,
x/(r + λ) + q(−k∗) × h(−x)/h(−k∗) − c
Dana and Le van (2014) pervades an individually rational efficient allocation
and an equilibrium setting under two conditions of (1) no arbitrage prices and (2)
no unbounded utility arbitrage. It is intended to broaden our viewpoints of under-
standing the non-negative expectations with respect to risk adjusted probabilities.
In connection with this issue, I wish to stretch newly to the argument of individual
and collective absence of arbitrage with overconfidence.
6. The unique equilibrium allocation with inertia at the speculative bubble
crush
The price system is the l-tuple p = (p1, ..., ph, ..., pl). The value of an action a
(arrow, 1959) relative to the price system p is
∑l
h=1 phah where ah is accumulation
factor.
11
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A feasible allocation (x1, ..., xI) induced from
∑
i xi ≤ ∑i wi where i are finitely
many agents indexed by i = 1, ..., I and a non-zero price vector p ∈ RS+ are an
equilibrium with inertia (Rigotti and Shannon, 2005) where S are possible states
of nature indexed by s = 1, ..., S if
for all i,
x i xi =⇒ p · x > p · wi (8)
and endowment wi ∈ RS+ wi ∈ RS+ is started at date 1 assumed that consumption
doesn’t occur at date 0 and consumption balance left after trading Arrow securities
and
for all i,
p · xi = p · wi,
and for each i, either
xi = wi,
or
Epii
[
ui(xi)
]
≥ Epii
[
ui(wi)
]
.
where Epi· denotes the expected value with respect to the probability distribution pi,
each pii ∈ Πi, ∃ a closed, convex set Πi and u(x) denotes the vector u(x1), ..., u(xS ).
Inertia drives an equilibrium in trading only at which is the status quo for all
traders so T is the set of agents who are involved in trading in this equilibrium,
T = {i : xi , wi}.
The number l of commodities is a given positive integer. An action a of an agent is
a point of Rl, the commodity space. A price system p is a point of Rl. The value of
an action a relative to a price system p is the inner product p · a. The equilibrium
allocation (w1, ...,wI) is supported by p as below,
p · a · xi = p · a · wi,
where a is accumulation factor.
In case of x < k∗ where k∗ is a trading point,
p · ψ(−k, x) · xi = p · ψ(−k, x) · wi.
In case of x ≥ k∗,
p · ψ(r, λ,−k, x) · xi = p · ψ(r, λ,−k, x) · wi.
12
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Hence, speculative bubble crushes at B(= φσ f /σs)/A > λ > −(σ f /σs)/A.
Here by, the standard simplex denoted as4 is the smallest convex set containing
the given vertices in RS+. Moreover, given a set 4, rint4 is the relative interior of 4.
Theorem 6.1. We assumed that ui is strictly concave and a closed, convex set of the
probability distribution Πi ⊂ rint4. If (w1, ...,wI) is an equilibrium allocation, then
there is the unique equilibrium allocation with inertia at the speculative bubble
crush when x < k∗.
Proof. Two cases are to be considered in their turn.
1. For x < k∗, given the resale option function ψ(−k, x), there exists a unique
equilibrium allocation:
p · ψ(−k, x) · xi > p · ψ(−k, x) · wi,
xi + (1/n)wi i wi,
p · ψ(−k, x)
[
xi + (1/n)wi
]
i p · ψ(−k, x) · wi,
that implies
p · ψ(−k, x) · xi > p · ψ(−k, x) · wi
Agents are restricted to the traders involved in trading. Hence, {xi , wi , φ}.
For example, given a set X, rint(X) denotes the relative interior of X. But
Πi ⊂ rint(4) = {pi ∈ 4 : pis > 0,∀s} .
For a subset C of 4 and C ⊂ 4, one obtains
rint(C) = {q ∈ C : a neighborhood V of q in Rs
such that V ∩ rint(4) ⊂ C}.
Now suppose that
p · ψ(−k, x) · xi = p · ψ(−k, x) · wi.
Fix α ∈ (0, 1). Then:
p · ψ(−k, x) · wi
= αp · ψ(−k, x) · wi − αp · ψ(−k, x) · wi + p · ψ(−k, x) · wi
= αp · ψ(−k, x) · wi + (1 − α)p · ψ(−k, x) · wi
= αp · ψ(−k, x) · xi + (1 − α)p · ψ(−k, x) · wi
= p ·
[
(αψ(−k, x)xi + (1 − α)ψ(−k, x)wi
]
.
13
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.21
Whence:
Epii
[
ui(xi)
]
≥ Epii
[
ui(wi)
]
,
that in turn implies, from the definition of an equilibrium with inertia:
Epii
[
ui(αxi + (1 − α)wi
]
> Epii
[
wi
]
, ∀pii ∈ Πi,
that implies, from the strict concavity of ui,
Epii
[
ui(αψ(−k, x)xi + (1 − α)ψ(−k, x)wi
]
= Epii
[
ψ(−k, x)wi
]
,
a contradiction.
2. For x ≥ k∗, given the resale function
p · ψ(r, λ,−k, x) · xi = p · ψ(r, λ,−k, x) · wi,
ψ(r, λ,−k, x) cannot get value at the origin of speculative bubble crush B(=
φσ fσs) > Aλ > −σ f /σs, that completes the statement.
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